“Many of my colleagues say, ‘Why do we need to do anything more on the border?’ and we do. We should do more. … What I learned today is we have adequate manpower, but not adequate technology.”

– Sen. Charles Schumer (D-New York), chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and Border Security, while visiting the U.S.-Mexico border in Arizona on March 27.

Sen. Schumer is one of the “gang of eight” senators who are expected to be submitting legislation within the next several days for a sweeping proposed immigration reform.

That proposal may delay changes to U.S. immigration procedures – such as a “path to citizenship” for currently undocumented migrants – until something is first done on border security. That “something” is likely to be a commitment to intensify the past ten years’ large-scale buildup in the U.S. border security apparatus.

Sen. Schumer’s comments indicate that instead of further increasing manpower – the Border Patrol has doubled since 2005, and quintupled since 1993 [PDF] – this new proposed buildup may focus on technology: sensors, drones, imagery, radar, cameras, communications and similar items along the border.

The Facts:

More technology would give U.S. border security personnel a fuller picture of what is happening at the border, in particular who is crossing. But it will also reveal, in sharp focus, how remarkably difficult the border is to secure.

The challenge is what law-enforcement officials often call the “endgame”: the act of bringing personnel to the place where something illegal is happening, and arresting those responsible. On its own, better technology will not ease the endgame.

An analogy is Central America, where U.S. military and Coast Guard assets use radars, aircraft and imagery to follow boats or aircraft suspected of trafficking drugs. Too often, the U.S. technology gets used simply to film traffickers calmly unloading bales of cargo in remote areas of places like eastern Honduras, where there is almost no government presence and little likelihood that authorities will confront them. The remarkable U.S. technology can capture this on video, but with no personnel on the ground, it can do little more than film it.

At the U.S.-Mexico border, something similar may happen in the vast stretches of desert and scrubland that improved U.S. technology would monitor. The new gadgets may find far more border crossers than were previously believed to exist. But they would do little to ease apprehensions.

A very illustrative example comes from an April 4 report by the Center for Investigative Reporting, which obtained documents about a new radar system, used by the Defense Department in Afghanistan, that U.S. Customs and Border Protection began testing along the border in Arizona late last year.

The VADER (Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar) system gave U.S. authorities a troubling result: they found that they have been missing many more crossings than they thought.

“Between October and December, records show, the remotely operated aircraft detected 7,333 border crossers during its Arizona missions. Border Patrol agents, however, reported 410 apprehensions during that time, according to an internal agency report.” …

“Another report that highlights what the radar system detected from October to mid-January underscores the agency’s struggle to measure results and shows conflicting numbers. Border Patrol agents apprehended 1,874 crossers that the sensor identified, but 1,962 more escaped capture.”

The VADER data showed Border Patrol apprehending well under half of the total number of illegal border crossers. This is much poorer than the pre-VADER results Border Patrol had claimed in a February U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, which found a 5-to-1 ratio of apprehensions to “got-aways” in the Tuscon sector in 2011.

It is not clear, then, whether more technology would help to secure the border, or whether it would merely show authorities more of what they are missing.

High-tech equipment can monitor remote zones that are hours from the nearest Border Patrol stations and miles from the nearest roads. But even if Border Patrol were to double its staffing levels again, it would still not have enough manpower to carry out endgame operations in all of these rugged, inaccessible areas along the 1,969-mile U.S.-Mexico border. Especially since, in many cases, pursuit would have to happen on foot and in conditions of poor ground visibility, especially at night.

In the best of cases, improved technology would help Border Patrol and other U.S. law enforcement agencies respond more quickly to increased crossings in new areas. This would require it to transfer its personnel across sectors much more frequently, a significant hardship to agents with families and roots in their current communities. (Right now, Border Patrol is slow to redeploy personnel. Among its nine Mexico border sectors, its very quiet El Paso sector continues to have the second-highest number of agents.) It would also mean a far greater number of agents spending longer periods in rustic “forward operating bases” in the wilderness, closer to the suspicious activity detected by high-tech sensors.

More technology might help U.S. agencies reorient their resources more nimbly than they do now. But it would not be a panacea for border security. If anything, it would highlight the extreme difficulty of the “endgame.”

– Adam Isacson

“We’ve seen the number of illegal aliens double, maybe even triple since amnesty talk started happening.”

— Unnamed Border Patrol agent to Townhall, July 20, 2012

The past few months have seen several claims that the possibility of immigration reform providing a pathway to citizenship for undocumented migrants would result in a significant increase in migrants seeking to enter the United States illegally.

The Facts:

The Border Patrol does not release its statistics about undocumented migrants it has apprehended—which the agency is currently using as its main border security indicator—until after the end of each fiscal year. Without this data, it is difficult assess whether or not there has been a spike in border crossings in recent months due to the possibility of immigration reform.

While U.S. agencies do not release monthly statistics, the Mexican government’s National Institute for Migration (Instituto Nacional de Migración, INM) does release monthly reports on the number of Mexicans whom U.S. authorities have repatriated back to their home country. During January and February 2013, INM received 54,818 Mexican nationals at its ports of entry in Mexico’s five border states. For the same two months in 2012, INM received 60,804, almost 6,000 more migrants than the current year. The number of Mexicans repatriated so far in 2013 is also significantly lower than the 66,711 reported for the first two months of 2011.

This drop in the number of repatriated Mexicans is also in line with the downward trend in Border Patrol apprehensions of Mexican nationals that we have seen since FY2006.

While fewer Mexican migrants are attempting to cross the border, the same cannot be said for Central American migrants, who continue to be willing to face multiple dangers, such as extortion and kidnapping, while crossing through Mexico in search of a better life in the United States. Border Patrol apprehensions of “other than Mexicans” (OTMs, the vast majority of which are Central Americans) doubled between FY 2011 and FY2012, when 94,532 OTMs were apprehended. INM statistics on Central Americans repatriated out of Mexico also show a slight increase in the first two months of 2013 compared to the same period for 2012.

Based on this information, if the number of Mexican migrants remained the same, there would have to be a staggering increase in Central Americans for border crossings to have doubled. U.S. authorities would need to have apprehended as many Central Americans as Mexicans in January and February of this year—around 55,000—something that has never happened. 55,000 apprehensions of Central Americans in two months would be equal to more than half of all of the OTMs the Border Patrol apprehended in all twelve months of FY2012, and it would mean that the FY2013 total would be on track to reach 330,000 apprehensions of OTMs—a 349 percent increase over last year. It is extremely unlikely that there has been such a dramatic increase in crossings by Central American migrants in the space of a few months. Thus, it is most unlikely that claims of a “doubling” of undocumented migration are true.

— Maureen Meyer

“[Tucson Sector Border Patrol Agent Colleen] Agle said smugglers often lie to immigrants, telling them they’ll only walk a couple of hours when they actually walk for days. Even so, the agency discourages water stations for crossers because authorities say it encourages people to risk the journey.”

— Amanda Lee Myers and Julie Watson, “Migrants say Arizona worth risk of crossing,” Associated Press, August 31, 2010

Border Patrol agents in south Texas have welcomed efforts to leave water out for migrants, in order to stem a rapid increase in the number of people dying on U.S. soil from dehydration. “Anytime someone can do something proactively like this it is great, Border Patrol Rio Grande Valley sector spokesman Henry Mendiola told Fox News Latino in January. “These are human lives we’re talking about.”

In Arizona, however, things are very different. Border Patrol agents interviewed by WOLA echoed the arguments in the quotes above. They contend that leaving water for migrants increases incentives for migration, and that much of the water ends up being used by smugglers. Arizona activist groups have resorted to leaving hidden cameras near their water stations, which have captured Border Patrol agents destroying water jugs.

The Facts:

A team from the University of Arizona published an extensive study last week that shows migrants’ need for water is desperate.

To produce In the Shadow of the Wall (PDF), Jeremy Slack, Daniel Martínez, Scott Whiteford, and Emily Peiffer led a team that surveyed 1,113 recent deportees in five Mexican border cities, as well as in Mexico City, between 2010 and 2012.

They found that dangerous journeys, with a very real risk of death from dehydration, are exceedingly common in places like southern Arizona and south Texas.

“Three quarters [of those surveyed - 72%] relied on a ‘coyote’ or human smuggler to get into the United States, agreeing to pay a median of 2,500 USD for their services. They walked for more than two days through the harsh conditions along the border. Thirty-nine percent ran out of water during their trip and 31% ran out of food. The extreme heat and harsh terrain where people cross has killed thousands of people.”

With two out of five migrants running out of water in the desert, the volunteers who leave it for them may be keeping many human beings from avoiding the fate of the 463 migrants whose remains Border Patrol counted [PDF] on the U.S. side of the border in 2012.

Dehydration and hunger are not the only dangers that the University of Arizona study revealed to be alarmingly common. Of those surveyed:

• 12 percent were robbed by bandits during their last crossing.
• 7 percent were kidnapped (83 out of 1,113; of these, 29 were kidnapped in the United States).
• 6 people witnessed rape.
• 2 people witnessed murders.
• 12 percent witnessed some form of violence against female migrants.
• 17 percent were victims of “cyber kidnappings,” defined as “where people call with false claims about having kidnapped a family member to extort a ransom.”

— Adam Isacson

“Operation Streamline, a fast-track program, resolves a federal criminal case with prison and deportation consequences in approximately two days or less. This program can serve as a deterrent against future illegal immigration in existing Border Patrol sectors.” — Sen. Chuck Grassley, May 17 2011.

Captured migrants who are sent to “Operation Streamline” enter the federal criminal court system, where they are processed very quickly. Normally about 40-80 migrants stand trial at a time, with guilty verdicts rapidly issued. Many receive prison sentences, usually of a few months’ duration. Supporters of the program, which began in 2005, dismiss charges that these speedy mass trials violate due process rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.

The Facts:

A team from the University of Arizona published an extensive study last week raising important concerns about due process in Operation Streamline. They find defendants are rarely informed about their rights, and are often advised by their own court-appointed defense lawyers to accept the charges against them.

To produce In the Shadow of the Wall (PDF), Jeremy Slack, Daniel Martínez, Scott Whiteford, and Emily Peiffer led a team that surveyed 1,113 recent deportees in five Mexican border cities, as well as in Mexico City, between 2010 and 2012.

They found that “Streamlined” deportees — 32 percent of those surveyed — were usually left in the dark about their legal rights.

“When asked ‘what did your lawyer inform you about your rights?’ only 40% mentioned some sort of basic legal right such as the right to silence or a fair trial. Forty percent stated that their lawyer simply informed them they needed to sign their deportation and plead guilty. Nine percent reported that their lawyers did not tell them anything. Only 2% reported being informed that they could denounce abuses and 1% (3 people) stated that the lawyer checked for legal migration options due to family connections, which is generally the first and most important duty of any immigration attorney.”

In addition, of “Streamlined” deportees, 92 percent said they were shackled at the wrists, waist, and ankles during the Operation Streamline process. Their median time spent in shackles was six hours. Thirty-eight percent of them were sent to a detention center. Eight percent reported being threatened by other inmates.

The University of Arizona study recommends ending Operation Streamline. It says Streamline “represents a violation of the U.S. Constitution by trying people in masse rather than as individuals.”

— Adam Isacson

How common or rare is abuse of migrants in U.S. custody?

“The Department of Homeland Security claims that only three complaints were lodged against Border Patrol detention conditions for the entirety of 2010 (the most current data), a year when agents apprehended more than 463,000 individuals. Only 10 complaints were filed for ‘abuse of authority’ that year and 13 for ‘discrimination.’ … Customs and Border Patrol in Washington responded in even more general terms: ‘CBP stresses honor and integrity in every aspect of our mission,’ an agency spokesperson said by email. ‘We do not tolerate abuse within our ranks, and … we are fully committed to protecting the health, safety and human rights of all individuals with whom we interact.’” — John Carlos Frey, “Cruelty on the Border,” Salon.com, July 20, 2012

The Facts:

Non-governmental groups have already documented what appears to be a far more widespread problem of migrant abuse while in the custody of U.S. authorities. Last week, a team from the University of Arizona published an extensive study adding new evidence.

To produce In the Shadow of the Wall (PDF), Jeremy Slack, Daniel Martínez, Scott Whiteford, and Emily Peiffer led a team that surveyed 1,113 recent deportees in five Mexican border cities, as well as in Mexico City, between 2010 and 2012.

Of those surveyed:

• 11 percent reported physical abuse by U.S. authorities.
• 23 percent reported verbal abuse by U.S. authorities.
• 45 percent did not receive sufficient food while in U.S. custody.
• 39 percent had possessions taken and not returned by U.S. authorities.
• 26 percent were carrying Mexican identifying documents and had at least one document taken and not returned.

On the other hand, 57 percent of deportees surveyed said that “everyone” or “the majority” of Border Patrol agents “treated me with respect” Twenty-nine percent said “about half of them treated me with respect.” Still, these numbers are indicative of more than just a few “bad apples.”

The University of Arizona study recommends a series of measures that Border Patrol and other agencies should take to review their use-of-force guidelines and to improve mechanisms for transparency and dealing with abuse complaints. These include reexamining internal affairs procedures, improving training programs, establishing a chain of custody for migrants’ possessions, and reevaluating legal procedures to ensure migrants know what they are signing.

— Adam Isacson

“ATEP [the Alien Transfer Exit Program] is an ongoing program whereby the Office of Border Patrol, in collaboration with ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO), moves Mexican nationals apprehended in one Border Patrol Sector to another ERO Area of Responsibility before removing them to Mexico. ATEP breaks the smuggling cycle by repatriating aliens into regions further east or west of their entry location and, thus, preventing them from immediately coordinating with their smugglers for re-entry.” — Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, congressional testimony, May 3, 2011

The ATEP program deports tens of thousands of migrants each year to Mexican border cities hundreds or thousands of miles from where they were apprehended. Critics of the program claim that it routinely separates families, and endangers migrants by dropping them off — often in the middle of the night — in unfamiliar border cities dominated by organized-crime groups who prey upon or even seek to recruit them. Defenders of ATEP say that these “lateral transfers” deter migrants from attempting to cross again.

The Facts:

A team from the University of Arizona has published an extensive study this week raising important concerns about the ATEP program. They find that the program rarely discourages repeat border crossings.

To produce In the Shadow of the Wall (PDF), Jeremy Slack, Daniel Martínez, Scott Whiteford, and Emily Peiffer led a team that surveyed 1,113 recent deportees in five Mexican border cities, as well as in Mexico City, between 2010 and 2012.

Their surveys lead them to conclude that ATEP “appears to have no impact on whether or not people will cross again.” In an e-mail communication, study co-author Daniel Martínez told WOLA that the 18 percent of surveyed deportees who were repatriated far from their point of apprehension were just as likely as other deportees to say they intended to attempt the crossing again.

“People who go through ATEP actually report intending to cross again at a higher rate than people who do not (31% of those processed through ATEP intend to cross within a week, compared to 24% of those who were not laterally repatriated). However, after one controls for various factors, the effect of ATEP on future crossings in not statistically significant. Ultimately, I can confidently say that ATEP does not influence future crossing decisions.”

The study also notes that of all deportees (including non-ATEP deportees), fully 18 percent were dropped off in Mexican border cities between the hours of 10:00PM and 5:00AM, a time when all basic services are closed and public security conditions are worst. Many of these night deportations are part of a surprising recent “increase in deportation to Mexico’s northeastern border where drug fueled violence has had a huge impact on migrants.”

The study recommends ending ATEP and ceasing night deportations.

— Adam Isacson

“My instructions to the Department of Homeland Security have been that we have to focus our attention, our enforcement, on people who genuinely pose a threat to our communities, not to hardworking families who are minding their own business and oftentimes have members of their family who are U.S. citizens — because that’s a — that’s a priority in terms of limited enforcement resources. … So more than half of our enforcement now is directed at people with criminal records. Of the remaining half, about two-thirds are actually people who are typically apprehended close to the border, so these are not people who have longstanding roots in our community.”

— President Barack Obama, Univision interview, September 20, 2012

The Facts:

A team from the University of Arizona has published an extensive study this week that casts doubt on the President’s affirmation. In fact, they find, the past few years’ record levels of deportations heavily affect “established” migrants who are separated from family members — many of whom are U.S. citizens.

To produce In the Shadow of the Wall (PDF), Jeremy Slack, Daniel Martínez, Scott Whiteford, and Emily Peiffer led a team that surveyed 1,113 recent deportees in five Mexican border cities, as well as in Mexico City, between 2010 and 2012. These cities accounted for 66 percent of all repatriations to Mexico in 2011.

They found that deportees with “longstanding roots in our community,” to use the President’s phrase, are common.

“Three quarters [74 percent] of deportees had previously lived or worked in the United States. Among those who had lived or worked in the United States, the median time spent in the country was seven years.”

The University of Arizona team found a disturbingly high incidence of family separation.

“Half [51 percent] had at least one family member who was a U.S. citizen, and nearly one in four [22 percent] had at least one child under the age of 18 who had U.S. citizenship.”

“This is a strikingly different portrait of deportees than the common conception of seasonal laborers and young single men with no real ties to the United States,” the study reminds us. It dovetails strongly with statistics released in April 2012, which showed that 22 percent of those deported by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement during the first half of 2011 — 46,486 people — were parents of U.S. citizen children.

With so many deportees forced to leave spouses and children behind, it should not be surprising that neither the deportation experience nor heightened border security is dissuading them from attempting to return. When asked whether they planned to cross back into the United States in the future, 56 percent of recent deportees said “yes.” Twenty-five percent said they would attempt the journey within the next week.

— Adam Isacson

“I was surprised, and frankly disappointed, to learn that the Border Patrol has four drones deployed in Arizona but only has the resources to fly two of them — and even then they cannot fly them every day of the week.”

— Sen. Tom Carper (D-Delaware), chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, at a March 14, 2013 hearing.

The Facts:

Perhaps even more surprising is the cost involved with operating a drone like the four MQ-9 Predator-B aircraft currently stationed at Libby Army Airfield in Sierra Vista, Arizona.

“For Fiscal Year 2010, DHS reported that its Predator B (a variant of DOD’s Reaper) costs approximately $3,234 per flight hour,” the U.S. Government Accountability Office reported in 2011. “This is the total direct and indirect cost, including fuel, maintenance, support services, and labor.”

Another three unmanned aircraft (two Predator-Bs and a Predator-B maritime variant) are currently patrolling the eastern part of the border from bases at Naval Station Corpus Christi, Texas and Cape Canaveral, Florida.

According to the Department of Homeland Security Inspector-General [PDF], the seven drones’ “desired capability” would be to operate for 13,328 flight hours per year. At the per-hour cost cited above, this would require US$43.1 million per year. That alone would equal about 9 percent of the entire operations, maintenance, and procurement budget for Customs and Border Protection’s Air and Marine branch (US$504 million), which employs 271 aircraft and 301 vessels throughout the United States and elsewhere in the world.

The Department of Homeland Security has declared its intention to increase the southwest border drone fleet to 11 by 2016. At this same rate, this would push the yearly cost to US$67.7 million.

Because they are so costly to operate, these drones may spend a lot of time on the ground over the next few years. It would seem that some of this is a result of a miscalculation by Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which has bought more drones than it can afford to operate. “CBP had not adequately planned for resources needed to support the current unmanned aircraft inventory,” notes the 2012 report [PDF] from the DHS Inspector-General, which adds that “CBP has not ensured that adequate resources are available to effectively operate its unmanned aircraft.”

The drones’ performance on the border, meanwhile, has been modest so far in terms of drugs seized or migrants detected: “The amount of illicit drugs seized in Predator raids is ‘not impressive,’” Michael Kostelnik, the head of CBP Air and Marine, told the Los Angeles Times in 2012.

The problem is likely to worsen this year as CBP — the large DHS agency of which the Air and Marine Branch is one part — is seeing its budget cut by about 5 percent, or US$512 million, as a result of sequestration.

An interesting final note: while Sen. Carper (who has a lifetime 87/100 “liberal” rating from Americans for Democratic Action) pushed at the March 14 hearing for more drones at the border, it was the Committee’s ranking Republican, Sen. Tom Coburn (R-Oklahoma, with a lifetime 98/100 “conservative” rating from the American Conservative Union), who voiced civil-liberties concerns.

“I have also questioned the Secretary [of Homeland Security] about her approval of the use of drones. In a March 2nd C- NET article, it was reported the DHS has customized its drone fleet to carry out domestic surveillance missions such as ‘identifying civilians carrying guns and tracking their cell phones,’ which fly in the face of civil liberties. We must ask whether the trade off in terms of border security is worth the privacy sacrifice.”

— Adam Isacson

Illegal immigration has risen steadily since the 1980s. While our research shows that new illegal entries have slackened somewhat since 2007, there are signs that the tide could be shifting again. According to numbers just released by CBP, in 2012 southwest border apprehensions, which the agency has used as an indicator of the number of illegal crossings, went up by nine percent.

— From the testimony of Jessica M. Vaughan, director of policy studies for the Center for Immigration Studies, given in a hearing of the U.S. House Judiciary Committee on February 5, 2013 [PDF].

The Facts:

Three statements here need correction or further explanation.

1. Illegal immigration has not “risen steadily since the 1980s.” Border Patrol migrant apprehension data show this clearly. While nobody knows how many migrants are actually crossing the border, the number of those whom Border Patrol captures are our best indicator of whether the overall number is going up or down.

Migrant apprehensions are significantly fewer now than they were in the 1980s. In fact, they’re at their lowest level since 1972. The following graph of apprehensions is drawn from Border Patrol data since 1960, available in this table [PDF] on CBP’s website.

2. New illegal entries have not “slackened somewhat since 2007.” If apprehensions are any measure, they have fallen precipitously, as the above graph shows. Apprehensions dropped a remarkably steep 58 percent since 2007, and 69 percent since 2005.

3. In perspective, the increase in apprehensions from 2011 to 2012 is too small to indicate a trend: 7 percent at the U.S.-Mexico border, and 9 percent throughout the country. The 2011 apprehensions figure was the lowest Border Patrol recorded since 1972; the 2012 figure was the second-lowest that Border Patrol recorded since 1972. There is no way to tell whether last year’s increase — which is almost too small to be visible on the above graph — is a blip in an overall downward trend, or a sign of a “shifting tide.”

It is clear, though, that the number of Mexican migrants is still dropping. Border Patrol apprehensions of Mexican citizens (blue in the below graph) dropped again in 2012, for the eighth straight year. Would-be migrants from Mexico are clearly being discouraged from attempting the trip by tougher measures in the United States, a sluggish U.S. economy, greater growth in Mexico, and the alarming security situation in Mexico’s border communities.

All of last year’s increase in apprehensions was due to a near-doubling of migrants from other countries, mainly Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador. “Other than Mexican” citizens made up 27 percent of all apprehended migrants in 2012, a far greater proportion than any other shown in Border Patrol’s records since 2000. (Border Patrol supplies these records online for apprehended Mexican citizens [PDF] and “other than Mexican” citizens [PDF].)

Nearly all of this increase in non-Mexican apprehensions occurred in south-east Texas, even as other Border Patrol sectors saw fewer apprehensions last year.

It is not clear why would-be Central American migrants are not being deterred by the same factors that are forcing down Mexican citizens’ migration. The poverty and violence currently suffered in Central America’s “northern triangle” countries is the most likely explanation.

Whatever the reason, the picture is complicated. And claims that migration is inexorably rising — as in the testimony cited here — don’t help us to understand it.

In late 2010, DHS reported that it could respond to illegal activity along only 44 percent of the Southwest border, leaving 7,500 border miles inadequately protected.

— Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas), chairman of the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management, November 15, 2012.

The Facts:

The 44 percent statistic comes from a February 2011 report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), based on interviews with Border Patrol. In the report, GAO found that Border Patrol had “operational control” of 873 miles of the 1,969-mile U.S.-Mexico border, or 44 percent. (The report did not investigate conditions at the United States’ 5,525-mile border with Canada, the remainder of Rep. McCaul’s 7,500-mile figure.)

Rep. McCaul’s statement implies that the term “operational control” means U.S. authorities “could respond to illegal activity.” In fact, the standard is significantly higher.

GAO defines operational control as “Border Patrol was able to detect, respond, and interdict cross-border illegal activity.” The 2006 Secure Fence Act has an even more stringent definition: “the prevention of all unlawful entries into the United States, including entries by terrorists, other unlawful aliens, instruments of terrorism, narcotics, and other contraband.”

By that standard, it is remarkable that U.S. authorities believed that they had so much control of 873 miles of terrain that nothing at all could cross the line. And the same GAO report found that, between 2005 and 2010, Border Patrol had added an average of 126 miles per year of border under operational control. If that rate continued in 2011 and 2012, then 1,125 miles of border — 57 percent — might be under operational control today.

(Chart from Februrary 2011 GAO report.)

We don’t know how much of the border is under operational control today, however. The Department of Homeland Security abandoned “operational control” as a measure of performance in 2011, opting instead for more of a “spectrum” or “continuum” approach than an “on or off” standard.

— Adam Isacson

Last November, the Republican Party majority of the U.S. House of Representatives’ Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management issued a report on border and hemispheric security. A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the Southwest Border alleges, among several other claims, that the U.S.-Mexico border is vulnerable to infiltration by Islamic terrorists seeking to do harm on U.S. soil.

“Of growing concern and potentially a more violent threat to American citizens is the enhanced ability of Middle East terrorist organizations, aided by their relationships and growing presence in the Western Hemisphere, to exploit the Southwest border to enter the United States undetected.”

The report calls on the U.S. government to mobilize against this vulnerability — which it compares to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis — before an attack materializes.

“Recognizing and proactively confronting threats has presented a perennial challenge to our country. In the case of the Cuban missile crisis, we failed to deal with the Soviet threat before it resulted in a full-blown crisis that threatened nuclear war. Now we are faced with a new threat in Latin America that comes from the growing collaborations between Iran, Venezuela, Hezbollah and transnational criminal organizations. Similar to the Cuban missile crisis, the evidence to compel action exists; the only question is whether we possess the imagination to connect the dots before another disaster strikes.”

The Facts:

To back up its argument that the U.S. government must make an even higher priority of the cross-border terrorism scenario, the Subcommittee cites the following pieces of “evidence to compel action.”

1. A May 2012 Los Angeles Times blog post, citing an unnamed former U.S. official, reported that Osama bin Laden supported the idea of terrorists with Mexican passports carrying out attacks inside the United States. U.S. intelligence analysts gleaned this from letters and notes seized from the Pakistan site where U.S. Special Forces killed bin Laden in 2011. The official gave no indication of an actual plot in the works; the context was apparently bin Laden’s personal preference that terrorist attackers not be people who had sworn a U.S. citizenship oath.

• Indication that individuals with terrorist links crossed border: No
• Claim of specific terrorist conspiracy: No

2. A statement from a former U.S. official:

“In August 2007 former Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell stated that not only have terrorists used the Southwest border to enter the United States but that they will inevitably continue to do so as long as it is an available possibility.”

This claim comes from an El Paso Times interview with former DNI McConnell. He does claim that “there are some” cases of terrorists coming across the Southwest border, but “not in great numbers.” When the interviewer tries repeatedly to get McConnell to be more specific, he replies:

• “The vast majority you don’t hear about.”
• “There are some. And would they use it as a path, given it was available to them? In time they will.”
• “There were a significant number of Iraqis who came across last year. Smuggled across illegally.”
• “Q: Can you give me any more detail [about the Iraqis]? A: I probably could if I had my notebook. It’s significant numbers. I’ll have somebody get it for you. I don’t remember what it is. The point is it went from a number to (triple) in a single year, because they figured it out. Now some we caught, some we didn’t. The ones that get in, what are they going to do? They’re going to write home.”

It is unclear whether the “Iraqis” McConnell refers to where proven terrorists, or simply migrants.

• Indication that individuals with terrorist links crossed border: Yes
• Examples given: None
• Evidence of specific terrorist conspiracy: No

3. A statement from a current U.S. official:

“In a July 2012 hearing before the full U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano confirmed that terrorists have crossed the Southwest border with the intent to harm the American people.”

When pressed for more detail, Napolitano told Rep. Ron Barber (D-Arizona),

“With respect, there have been—and the Ababziar matter would be one I would refer to that’s currently being adjudicated in the criminal courts—from time to time, and we are constantly working against different and evolving threats involving various terrorist groups and various ways they may seek to enter the country.”

Napolitano provided no further information. As WOLA has noted before, the “Ababziar matter” involved Iranian operatives allegedly seeking help from Mexico’s Zetas criminal organization for a plot to kill Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States. But the Iranians, in fact, never ended up making contact with the Zetas.

• Indication that individuals with terrorist links crossed border: Yes
• Examples given: None
• Evidence of specific terrorist conspiracy: No

4. Apprehensions of migrants from 35 countries that the U.S. intelligence community considers to be of “special interest” because they “could export individuals that could bring harm to our country in the way of terrorism.” According to the Subcommittee, U.S. authorities apprehended 1,918 citizens of these 35 countries in the U.S.-Mexico border zone between 2006 and 2011. There is no indication whether any of these individuals in fact posed a terrorist threat, or whether they were merely would-be migrants.

• Indication that individuals with terrorist links crossed border: No
• Evidence of specific terrorist conspiracy: No

5. The case of Said Jaziri, a Tunisian cleric captured in the trunk of a vehicle in San Diego, California in January 2011. Jaziri was not accused of plotting any terrorist activity. He had been convicted in France “for assaulting an individual whom he believed to be a less-devout Muslim,” and while in Canada had “called for the death” — as the London Daily Mail put it — of the Danish cartoonist whose images of the Prophet Mohammed sparked outrage in the Muslim world in 2006.

• Indication that individuals with terrorist links crossed border: No
• Evidence of specific terrorist conspiracy: No

6. The case of Ahmed Dhakane, a Somali convicted of running “a large-scale smuggling operation out of Brazil that specialized in smuggling East Africans into the United States.” Prosecutors claim that among the migrants whom Dhakane smuggled were three Somalis “whom Dhakane knew to be supporters or operatives of AIAI [Al-Ittihad Al-Islami, a group on the U.S. terrorist list] and of the Somali terrorist organization Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin (al-Shabaab).” The Subcommittee report mentions no intention or plan to carry out terrorist activities in the United States.

• Indication that individuals with terrorist links crossed border: Yes
• Examples given: One, three individuals
• Evidence of specific terrorist conspiracy: No

7. The case of Anthony Joseph Tracy, convicted in 2010 for helping “approximately 272 Somalis [to] enter the United States illegally.” Tracy said that members of al-Shabaab had asked for his help getting to the United States, “but that he declined to help them. In spite of this denial, investigators discovered an ominous email message from Tracy where he wrote: ‘i helped a lot of Somalis and most are good but there are some who are bad and i leave them to ALLAH…’”

• Indication that individuals with terrorist links crossed border: Unclear
• Examples given: None
• Evidence of specific terrorist conspiracy: No

The authors of the Subcommittee report are right that the hypothetical scenario of terrorists crossing the border from Mexico demands constant vigilance. It would be irresponsible to dismiss it.

But with the evidence they present — vague official statements, three cases with no mention of any intent to engage in terrorist activity — the authors of the report do not make the case that U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies need to be more vigilant than they already are.

The amount of intelligence, military and law enforcement resources available to monitor potential threats is finite. With more immediate concerns in North Africa, Syria, Afghanistan-Pakistan and elsewhere, the resources available to monitor Latin America and the Caribbean are even more limited.

U.S. authorities must choose wisely how these resources get used. Organized crime, money laundering, arms, drug and human trafficking, corruption, and migrant deaths already pose daily challenges in the U.S.-Mexico border area.

Preparing for possible cross-border Islamic terrorism is a significant additional challenge, but the Subcommittee report acknowledges that it requires “imagination” at this point. The State Department, meanwhile, reported last July that “no known international terrorist organization had an operational presence in Mexico and no terrorist group targeted U.S. citizens in or from Mexican territory.”

In our view, the evidence presented in the Line in the Sand report is not compelling enough to justify diverting resources — whether existing or additional — away from challenges that U.S. personnel already face every day in the U.S.-Mexico border zone.

— Adam Isacson

“It’s simple to me to fix it. I think you control the border first. You create a pathway for those people that are here — you don’t say you’ve got to go home. And that is a position that I’ve evolved on. Because, you know what, it’s got to be resolved. The majority of people here, if some people have criminal records you can send them home, but if people are here, law-abiding, participating for years, their kids are born here, you know, first secure the border, pathway to citizenship, done.”

— Conservative radio host Sean Hannity, November 8, 2012.

Numerous leading Republicans appear to be adopting a pro-immigration reform stance in the aftermath of Mitt Romney’s November 6 presidential election defeat, in which the Latino vote played an important role [PDF].

Like Hannity, though, many of these suddenly pro-reform figures stipulate that the border must first be secured before there can be movement toward comprehensive immigration reform.

“I have a simple request for the President and Congress: Secure our border first,” reads a November 9 statement [PDF] from Arizona Governor Jan Brewer (R). “Demonstrate that you take seriously the safety concerns of Americans living in the border region. With that completed, we can pursue – together – ways to fix our Nation’s broader immigration system in a fashion that is effective, practical and humane.”

“When you see this comprehensive immigration reform coming like a train, on our side, we are all very interested in that issue, but we have to have a high degree of confidence that our borders are secure,” said Rep. Candace Miller (R-Michigan), chairwoman of the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border Security.

The Facts:

“Securing the border first” may prove to be an impossible standard to meet. Relying on this standard could become a means to postpone immigration reform indefinitely.

• Though apprehensions of migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border dropped by 61 percent between 2005 and 2011, the U.S. Border Patrol still apprehended 327,577 migrants there in 2011[PDF]. Though in fewer numbers, migrants are still able to get through.

• Seizures of drugs in the U.S-Mexico border zone remain near all-time high levels [PDF, see page 50]. While this indicates more effectiveness at stopping drugs, it also shows that traffickers are not being deterred.

• While crime statistics show that “spillover” of violence from Mexico is very rare, incidents do occur, like the September 2010 murder of a boater on Falcon Lake, Texas; the December 2010 murder of Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry in Arizona; and the October 2011 wounding of a sheriff’s deputy in Hidalgo County, Texas.

• 649 miles of the 1,954-mile border now has a fence running along it [PDF, see page 9], but most of the Texas-Mexico border along the winding Rio Grande remains unfenced. To build a fence, estimates Texas Governor Rick Perry (R-Texas), would “take 10 to 15 years and US$30 billion.”

The 2006 Secure Fence Act [PDF] set out the following definition for “operational control” of the border: “the prevention of all unlawful entries into the United States, including entries by terrorists, other unlawful aliens, instruments of terrorism, narcotics, and other contraband.”

Despite a large federal border-security buildup and a sharp reduction in migration and violence on the U.S. side of the border, that standard of preventing all unlawful entries remains far from met, and is likely to remain so.

“They’ll never secure the border 100 percent,” the controversial sheriff of Arizona’s Maricopa County, Joe Arpaio, told the conservative Breitbart News website on November 13. “So it’s a cop-out so you don’t do anything in the interior.”

If opponents want to delay comprehensive immigration reform indefinitely, they can do so by insisting on “securing the border first.” It seems disingenuous, though, to do so while claiming to support immigration reform.

— Adam Isacson