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Are “failed U.S. policies” to blame for the rise in unaccompanied Central American migrant children?


“[T]he current surge is far more than a humanitarian crisis resulting from violence and economic failures in Central America. The perception of eventual legal status has been generated through your Administrative actions.”


— Letter to President Obama from 34 Republican members of Congress, July 2, 2014

The border between Texas and Mexico has seen a big recent increase in arrivals of unaccompanied children from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. This July 2 letter, circulated by House Government Reform and Oversight Committee Chairman Rep. Darrell Issa (R-California), seeks to blame the Obama administration for the crisis, citing “failed policies that encourage young individuals to put themselves in peril, leave their home countries, and make a long and dangerous journey to enter our country illegally.”

This letter does not provide any substantial evidence to back up what have become immigration hardliners’ talking points on the failures of U.S. policies. Though evidence strongly suggests that violence is a major “push factor,” the 34 legislators’ letter instead insists that the policies spurring Central Americans to send children northward are:

Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), an administrative change that President Barack Obama implemented in June 2012. DACA came after Congress failed to pass the “Dream Act,” legislation that would have given permanent residency to children who arrived in the United States as minors and received college degrees or performed military service. Under DACA, young undocumented people who have lived in the United States since 2007 and meet the “Dream Act” standards may live and work in the United States, although they do not get permanent resident status.
The Obama administration’s expressed support for immigration reform legislation that passed the Senate in June 2013, but has stalled in the House. The bill would have created a “path to citizenship” for some undocumented people in the United States.
The March 2014 White House announcement that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security would review its deportation procedures. In this announcement, President Obama “emphasized his deep concern about the pain too many families feel from the separation that comes from our broken immigration system.”
The Facts:

It’s unlikely that Central American families are paying such close attention to discussions of administrative changes within the U.S. executive branch. Even leaving this aside, there are at least four reasons why the House members’ letter’s claims are inaccurate.

The administrative changes cited in the letter had not yet occurred when the so-called “surge” of unaccompanied minors began.
Border Patrol statistics, depicted above, show that arrivals of unaccompanied Central American children began increasing during U.S. fiscal year 2012, which ran from October 2011 to September 2012. DACA was not announced until June 2012. Immigration reform legislation had not yet been proposed, and the review of deportation procedures was far off. In fact, in 2012 the Obama administration broke the United States’ single-year record for deportations of undocumented foreign citizens (409,849 people): hardly a welcoming message for would-be migrants.

It’s not just minors. Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran adults are leaving too. And the exodus is going to other countries.
In 2011, Border Patrol apprehended 46,997 citizens of countries “other than Mexico”—the vast majority from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—near the Mexico border. So far this year (as of June 15), it has apprehended 181,724: on pace to register a three-year increase of 450 percent.

The United States may be the main destination, but several countries are seeing a similar rise in fleeing Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Hondurans. Between 2008 and 2013, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees reports, the number of those countries’ citizens applying for asylum in nearby Belize, Costa Rica, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama rose by 712 percent.

The post-2011 rise in Central American migration, and the rise in asylum claims elsewhere, indicate that violence is the preponderant factor. Central America’s three “Northern Triangle” countries, especially Honduras, saw big increases in violent crime during the second half of the 2000s; by the 2010s these had reached levels higher than those of pre-“surge” Iraq. Gang and organized crime activity—assaults, kidnapping, extortion, rape, forced recruitment—touches nearly all the population, particularly youth. With police and justice systems near collapse amid resource scarcity and unpunished corruption, these countries’ citizens are left utterly unprotected by their states.



There is no “surge” of unaccompanied Mexican minors.
In 2009, Border Patrol apprehended 16,114 unaccompanied Mexican children, a figure that dwarfed the 3,304 Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran children it reported that year. Even as the number of Central American children shot upward in 2012, the number of Mexican children did not. In 2014, apprehensions of Mexican minors are on pace to match 2013 levels (about 17,250), a 7 percent increase over 2009. By contrast, 2014 apprehensions of Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran minors are on pace to nearly triple 2013 levels, and to exceed 2009 apprehensions by over 1,500 percent.

Why are arrivals of unaccompanied Mexican minors relatively flat? One is less intense violence: Mexico saw a sharp increase in violent crime since the mid-2000s, but it is concentrated in a few areas. The country’s overall homicide rate today is only about a quarter as high as Honduras’s. Another is that the United States has repatriation agreements with Mexico, which include Mexican government security guarantees, that make returning unaccompanied minors a very rapid process.

While violence and poverty are the main drivers, something did happen in late 2013 and early 2014 to increase still further the rate of unaccompanied minors arriving in the United States.
In a sense, there have been two increases in arrivals of unaccompanied children. One increase began at the beginning of 2012, most likely driven by the sharp rise in violent crime in the Northern Triangle. The next, even sharper, increase began early this year.

The two trendlines are evident in this graph depicting month-by-month numbers of unaccompanied minors in the custody of the U.S. Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), to which other U.S. authorities must turn over apprehended minors within 72 hours. It appears in a June 23 Congressional Research Service report.



2013, like 2012, saw an accelerating increase in arrivals of unaccompanied children. Flight from violence, including specific threats from MS-13, Barrio 18, and other criminal organizations, was likely the most significant cause. There were larger-than-normal seasonal increases in migration (and thus apprehensions) after January 2012 and January 2013. But the increase after January 2014 was even steeper. The trendline took an entirely different shape: that of a hockey stick.

Nobody knows what happened about six months ago to cause this sharp increase. There was no dramatic reported worsening of Central America’s already severe violent crime or poverty rates. There is no evidence that Central Americans suddenly came to view DACA (which only benefits people in the United States before 2007) or the stalled U.S. immigration reform debate as “green lights” to send their children northward.

One possibility is that the “hockey stick” was triggered by word spreading among the Central American population that the children who arrived since 2012 were not being detained and quickly deported. (Smugglers looking for customers may have helped spread this information.) Instead, after receiving “notices to appear” in immigration court, they were being released to—and thus reunited with—family members.

This has happened not because of DACA or immigration reform, but in accordance with an anti-human trafficking law that the U.S. Congress unanimously approved, and President George W. Bush signed into law, in December 2008. Section 235(b) of the “William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act” states that:

Unaccompanied children from “non-contiguous countries” (that is, all countries other than Canada and Mexico) must be transferred to the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services. The HHS Office of Refugee Resettlement must see that they are “promptly placed in the least restrictive setting that is in the best interest of the child.”
Placing a child in a “secure facility” is only called for “if a suitable family member is not available to provide care.”
“To the greatest extent practicable,” children are to have counsel represent them in legal proceedings, which may include applications for protected status. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has noted that many Central American children fleeing violence may meet the criteria for refugee status.
These legal proceedings take time, especially now that the system adjudicating such cases is overwhelmed. As a result, even if their status is never legalized and they end up eventually being deported, migrant children may end up spending a year or two living with parents or other close relatives who had come to the United States earlier. 

That would mean a year or two in which parents need not worry about their child being killed, raped, or recruited by gangs. A year or two in which the child can eat three meals per day, attend school, and face at least a slim possibility of remaining in the United States. It is easy to imagine why a parent or other close relative would find this attractive enough to scrape together as much as US$10,000 to pay a smuggler’s fee.

That so many parents would leave children behind in the first place is a direct result of U.S. policy. Crossing the U.S.-Mexico border is now difficult and dangerous, after a large border security buildup that began in the 1990s and intensified in the 2000s. Before then, parents who migrated to the United States to earn money as undocumented workers could expect to go home periodically and see their children. Now, they do not attempt it because the likelihood of returning to the United States afterward is so slim. As a result, migrant parents in the United States go many years without seeing their children.

A child who was left behind while an infant or toddler 10-15 years ago is of prime gang recruitment age today, and parents’ desperation to be reunited is probably greater. The promise of doing so through the Section 235(b) process, even if temporarily while a child’s case is being adjudicated, may be a strong pull.

The research does not yet exist to confirm that the Section 235(b) provision has caused the 2014 acceleration in unaccompanied Central American minors’ migration. WOLA researchers did not hear it mentioned in interviews with migrants, migrant defenders, or shelter personnel during a February visit to Mexico’s southern border. 

On the other hand, some press reports and comments from U.S. officials have mentioned Central Americans’ belief that the U.S. government is granting special permits (“permisos”) for children. This may be a mistaken reference to the “notices to appear” issued to those being released into relatives’ custody. We do not know how widespread this belief is in Central America, or when it began to spread. But if it did, it explains some of the sharp 2014 increase in unaccompanied children arriving in the United States.

Whatever the reason, the U.S. government must take seriously all unaccompanied minors’ claims for protection, even if many are ultimately found to lack sufficient merit. The criminal gangs and organized crime groups driving Central America’s out-of-control violence do target young people. A significant portion of the children here probably face a credible and specific threat of death or other harm. They can also credibly claim that their own governments are unwilling or unable to protect them.

Identifying these threatened individual minors, and evaluating their cases, will take time. An expedited effort to process and deport them must not put them in harm’s way. U.S. authorities must consider each case separately.

The Obama administration is promising to “fix” the procedure for unaccompanied minors set out in the 2008 law. A funding request that the White House submitted to Congress on July 8 calls for “increased detainment and removal of adults with children and increased immigration court capacity to speed cases.” A June 30 letter to Congress from President Obama promises administrative measures “providing the DHS Secretary additional authority to exercise discretion in processing the return and removal of unaccompanied minor children.”

These measures may be necessary to deal with an overwhelmed system, but the imperative to “speed cases” must not weaken Central American children’s right to due process. Procedural changes must not mean the kind of haste that leads to deporting children who face a high probability of being killed or otherwise harmed.



As for the claims in the 34 House members’ letter? They are patently false. They ignore the timing of the wave of unaccompanied children’s arrivals. They ignore the region-wide nature of the trend. They ignore the impact of the 2008 law—the letter doesn’t even mention it—and propose no way to protect thousands of children who may face grave threats to their lives if forcibly returned. 

Instead, the letter pins the blame for the crisis on a modest measure, and two unfinished proposals, made during the Obama administration’s tenure. This leaves the unpleasant impression that its signers are comfortable using a genuine humanitarian emergency to score political points.

— Adam Isacson

Are “failed U.S. policies” to blame for the rise in unaccompanied Central American migrant children?

“[T]he current surge is far more than a humanitarian crisis resulting from violence and economic failures in Central America. The perception of eventual legal status has been generated through your Administrative actions.”

Letter to President Obama from 34 Republican members of Congress, July 2, 2014

The border between Texas and Mexico has seen a big recent increase in arrivals of unaccompanied children from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. This July 2 letter, circulated by House Government Reform and Oversight Committee Chairman Rep. Darrell Issa (R-California), seeks to blame the Obama administration for the crisis, citing “failed policies that encourage young individuals to put themselves in peril, leave their home countries, and make a long and dangerous journey to enter our country illegally.”

This letter does not provide any substantial evidence to back up what have become immigration hardliners’ talking points on the failures of U.S. policies. Though evidence strongly suggests that violence is a major “push factor,” the 34 legislators’ letter instead insists that the policies spurring Central Americans to send children northward are:

  • Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), an administrative change that President Barack Obama implemented in June 2012. DACA came after Congress failed to pass the “Dream Act,” legislation that would have given permanent residency to children who arrived in the United States as minors and received college degrees or performed military service. Under DACA, young undocumented people who have lived in the United States since 2007 and meet the “Dream Act” standards may live and work in the United States, although they do not get permanent resident status.
  • The Obama administration’s expressed support for immigration reform legislation that passed the Senate in June 2013, but has stalled in the House. The bill would have created a “path to citizenship” for some undocumented people in the United States.
  • The March 2014 White House announcement that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security would review its deportation procedures. In this announcement, President Obama “emphasized his deep concern about the pain too many families feel from the separation that comes from our broken immigration system.”

The Facts:

It’s unlikely that Central American families are paying such close attention to discussions of administrative changes within the U.S. executive branch. Even leaving this aside, there are at least four reasons why the House members’ letter’s claims are inaccurate.

  1. The administrative changes cited in the letter had not yet occurred when the so-called “surge” of unaccompanied minors began.

Border Patrol statistics, depicted above, show that arrivals of unaccompanied Central American children began increasing during U.S. fiscal year 2012, which ran from October 2011 to September 2012. DACA was not announced until June 2012. Immigration reform legislation had not yet been proposed, and the review of deportation procedures was far off. In fact, in 2012 the Obama administration broke the United States’ single-year record for deportations of undocumented foreign citizens (409,849 people): hardly a welcoming message for would-be migrants.

  1. It’s not just minors. Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran adults are leaving too. And the exodus is going to other countries.

In 2011, Border Patrol apprehended 46,997 citizens of countries “other than Mexico”—the vast majority from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—near the Mexico border. So far this year (as of June 15), it has apprehended 181,724: on pace to register a three-year increase of 450 percent.

The United States may be the main destination, but several countries are seeing a similar rise in fleeing Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Hondurans. Between 2008 and 2013, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees reports, the number of those countries’ citizens applying for asylum in nearby Belize, Costa Rica, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama rose by 712 percent.

The post-2011 rise in Central American migration, and the rise in asylum claims elsewhere, indicate that violence is the preponderant factor. Central America’s three “Northern Triangle” countries, especially Honduras, saw big increases in violent crime during the second half of the 2000s; by the 2010s these had reached levels higher than those of pre-“surge” Iraq. Gang and organized crime activity—assaults, kidnapping, extortion, rape, forced recruitment—touches nearly all the population, particularly youth. With police and justice systems near collapse amid resource scarcity and unpunished corruption, these countries’ citizens are left utterly unprotected by their states.

  1. There is no “surge” of unaccompanied Mexican minors.

In 2009, Border Patrol apprehended 16,114 unaccompanied Mexican children, a figure that dwarfed the 3,304 Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran children it reported that year. Even as the number of Central American children shot upward in 2012, the number of Mexican children did not. In 2014, apprehensions of Mexican minors are on pace to match 2013 levels (about 17,250), a 7 percent increase over 2009. By contrast, 2014 apprehensions of Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran minors are on pace to nearly triple 2013 levels, and to exceed 2009 apprehensions by over 1,500 percent.

Why are arrivals of unaccompanied Mexican minors relatively flat? One is less intense violence: Mexico saw a sharp increase in violent crime since the mid-2000s, but it is concentrated in a few areas. The country’s overall homicide rate today is only about a quarter as high as Honduras’s. Another is that the United States has repatriation agreements with Mexico, which include Mexican government security guarantees, that make returning unaccompanied minors a very rapid process.

  1. While violence and poverty are the main drivers, something did happen in late 2013 and early 2014 to increase still further the rate of unaccompanied minors arriving in the United States.

In a sense, there have been two increases in arrivals of unaccompanied children. One increase began at the beginning of 2012, most likely driven by the sharp rise in violent crime in the Northern Triangle. The next, even sharper, increase began early this year.

The two trendlines are evident in this graph depicting month-by-month numbers of unaccompanied minors in the custody of the U.S. Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), to which other U.S. authorities must turn over apprehended minors within 72 hours. It appears in a June 23 Congressional Research Service report.

2013, like 2012, saw an accelerating increase in arrivals of unaccompanied children. Flight from violence, including specific threats from MS-13, Barrio 18, and other criminal organizations, was likely the most significant cause. There were larger-than-normal seasonal increases in migration (and thus apprehensions) after January 2012 and January 2013. But the increase after January 2014 was even steeper. The trendline took an entirely different shape: that of a hockey stick.

Nobody knows what happened about six months ago to cause this sharp increase. There was no dramatic reported worsening of Central America’s already severe violent crime or poverty rates. There is no evidence that Central Americans suddenly came to view DACA (which only benefits people in the United States before 2007) or the stalled U.S. immigration reform debate as “green lights” to send their children northward.

One possibility is that the “hockey stick” was triggered by word spreading among the Central American population that the children who arrived since 2012 were not being detained and quickly deported. (Smugglers looking for customers may have helped spread this information.) Instead, after receiving “notices to appear” in immigration court, they were being released to—and thus reunited with—family members.

This has happened not because of DACA or immigration reform, but in accordance with an anti-human trafficking law that the U.S. Congress unanimously approved, and President George W. Bush signed into law, in December 2008. Section 235(b) of the “William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act” states that:

  • Unaccompanied children from “non-contiguous countries” (that is, all countries other than Canada and Mexico) must be transferred to the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services. The HHS Office of Refugee Resettlement must see that they are “promptly placed in the least restrictive setting that is in the best interest of the child.”
  • Placing a child in a “secure facility” is only called for “if a suitable family member is not available to provide care.”
  • “To the greatest extent practicable,” children are to have counsel represent them in legal proceedings, which may include applications for protected status. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has noted that many Central American children fleeing violence may meet the criteria for refugee status.

These legal proceedings take time, especially now that the system adjudicating such cases is overwhelmed. As a result, even if their status is never legalized and they end up eventually being deported, migrant children may end up spending a year or two living with parents or other close relatives who had come to the United States earlier.

That would mean a year or two in which parents need not worry about their child being killed, raped, or recruited by gangs. A year or two in which the child can eat three meals per day, attend school, and face at least a slim possibility of remaining in the United States. It is easy to imagine why a parent or other close relative would find this attractive enough to scrape together as much as US$10,000 to pay a smuggler’s fee.

That so many parents would leave children behind in the first place is a direct result of U.S. policy. Crossing the U.S.-Mexico border is now difficult and dangerous, after a large border security buildup that began in the 1990s and intensified in the 2000s. Before then, parents who migrated to the United States to earn money as undocumented workers could expect to go home periodically and see their children. Now, they do not attempt it because the likelihood of returning to the United States afterward is so slim. As a result, migrant parents in the United States go many years without seeing their children.

A child who was left behind while an infant or toddler 10-15 years ago is of prime gang recruitment age today, and parents’ desperation to be reunited is probably greater. The promise of doing so through the Section 235(b) process, even if temporarily while a child’s case is being adjudicated, may be a strong pull.

The research does not yet exist to confirm that the Section 235(b) provision has caused the 2014 acceleration in unaccompanied Central American minors’ migration. WOLA researchers did not hear it mentioned in interviews with migrants, migrant defenders, or shelter personnel during a February visit to Mexico’s southern border.

On the other hand, some press reports and comments from U.S. officials have mentioned Central Americans’ belief that the U.S. government is granting special permits (“permisos”) for children. This may be a mistaken reference to the “notices to appear” issued to those being released into relatives’ custody. We do not know how widespread this belief is in Central America, or when it began to spread. But if it did, it explains some of the sharp 2014 increase in unaccompanied children arriving in the United States.

Whatever the reason, the U.S. government must take seriously all unaccompanied minors’ claims for protection, even if many are ultimately found to lack sufficient merit. The criminal gangs and organized crime groups driving Central America’s out-of-control violence do target young people. A significant portion of the children here probably face a credible and specific threat of death or other harm. They can also credibly claim that their own governments are unwilling or unable to protect them.

Identifying these threatened individual minors, and evaluating their cases, will take time. An expedited effort to process and deport them must not put them in harm’s way. U.S. authorities must consider each case separately.

The Obama administration is promising to “fix” the procedure for unaccompanied minors set out in the 2008 law. A funding request that the White House submitted to Congress on July 8 calls for “increased detainment and removal of adults with children and increased immigration court capacity to speed cases.” A June 30 letter to Congress from President Obama promises administrative measures “providing the DHS Secretary additional authority to exercise discretion in processing the return and removal of unaccompanied minor children.”

These measures may be necessary to deal with an overwhelmed system, but the imperative to “speed cases” must not weaken Central American children’s right to due process. Procedural changes must not mean the kind of haste that leads to deporting children who face a high probability of being killed or otherwise harmed.

As for the claims in the 34 House members’ letter? They are patently false. They ignore the timing of the wave of unaccompanied children’s arrivals. They ignore the region-wide nature of the trend. They ignore the impact of the 2008 law—the letter doesn’t even mention it—and propose no way to protect thousands of children who may face grave threats to their lives if forcibly returned.

Instead, the letter pins the blame for the crisis on a modest measure, and two unfinished proposals, made during the Obama administration’s tenure. This leaves the unpleasant impression that its signers are comfortable using a genuine humanitarian emergency to score political points.

— Adam Isacson

Filed under Central America Migration Unaccompanied Minors Border Security U.S. Congress

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Is Doubling Border Patrol (Again) a Wise Use of Border Security Resources?


  "This is border security on steroids."


— Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tennessee), remarking on an amendment to immigration reform legislation (S. 744) that he and Sen. John Hoeven (R-North Dakota) are introducing in the U.S. Senate.

The Corker amendment would roughly double the size of U.S. Border Patrol to about 40,000 members. Is that a wise use of funds?

The Facts:

Border Patrol has already doubled in size [PDF] since 2005, and quintupled in size since 1993. There were 9,891 agents stationed at the U.S.-Mexico border in 2005; by the end of 2012 there were 18,516.

Meanwhile, border crossings are way down. In 2000, Border Patrol agents apprehended [PDF] 1,643,679 people near the U.S.-Mexico border. By last year, that number had dropped to 356,873.

As the agency grew and border-crossers dropped, the number of “apprehensions per agent” has fallen to historic lows. In 2000 each Border Patrol agent at the U.S.-Mexico border apprehended an average of 192 border-crossers. By 2012 the average was 19 apprehensions per agent.

Given this remarkable drop, is not clear how much more a further doubling of Border Patrol would achieve. Dropping the ratio to 10 apprehensions per agent per year would be a small gain for such a great expense.

That expense would be immense. If we very conservatively estimate the cost of maintaining a Border Patrol officer (salary, benefits, training, vehicles, fuel, uniforms, etc.) at US$100,000 per year, then 20,000 new agents would cost the U.S. Treasury US$2 billion per year. (The agency’s current budget [PDF] is about US$3.5 billion.)

An additional US$2 billion per year is far more money than the current Senate immigration reform bill contemplates spending. S.744 foresees up to US$6.5 billion total, to be spent over five-plus years, in new border security funds.

Given these apprehension and staffing trends, doubling Border Patrol does not appear to be the most efficient use of an additional US$2 billion per year.

"For people who are concerned about border security, once they see what’s in this bill, it’s almost overkill," Sen. Corker said today. We agree with that, except for the “almost.”

—Adam Isacson

Is Doubling Border Patrol (Again) a Wise Use of Border Security Resources?

"This is border security on steroids."

— Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tennessee), remarking on an amendment to immigration reform legislation (S. 744) that he and Sen. John Hoeven (R-North Dakota) are introducing in the U.S. Senate.

The Corker amendment would roughly double the size of U.S. Border Patrol to about 40,000 members. Is that a wise use of funds?

The Facts:

Border Patrol has already doubled in size [PDF] since 2005, and quintupled in size since 1993. There were 9,891 agents stationed at the U.S.-Mexico border in 2005; by the end of 2012 there were 18,516.

Meanwhile, border crossings are way down. In 2000, Border Patrol agents apprehended [PDF] 1,643,679 people near the U.S.-Mexico border. By last year, that number had dropped to 356,873.

As the agency grew and border-crossers dropped, the number of “apprehensions per agent” has fallen to historic lows. In 2000 each Border Patrol agent at the U.S.-Mexico border apprehended an average of 192 border-crossers. By 2012 the average was 19 apprehensions per agent.

Given this remarkable drop, is not clear how much more a further doubling of Border Patrol would achieve. Dropping the ratio to 10 apprehensions per agent per year would be a small gain for such a great expense.

That expense would be immense. If we very conservatively estimate the cost of maintaining a Border Patrol officer (salary, benefits, training, vehicles, fuel, uniforms, etc.) at US$100,000 per year, then 20,000 new agents would cost the U.S. Treasury US$2 billion per year. (The agency’s current budget [PDF] is about US$3.5 billion.)

An additional US$2 billion per year is far more money than the current Senate immigration reform bill contemplates spending. S.744 foresees up to US$6.5 billion total, to be spent over five-plus years, in new border security funds.

Given these apprehension and staffing trends, doubling Border Patrol does not appear to be the most efficient use of an additional US$2 billion per year.

"For people who are concerned about border security, once they see what’s in this bill, it’s almost overkill," Sen. Corker said today. We agree with that, except for the “almost.”

—Adam Isacson

Filed under Border Security U.S. Congress

0 notes

Is the Cornyn Amendment’s Border Security Standard a “Poison Pill” for Immigration Reform?

"The Secretary [of Homeland Security] may not adjust the status of aliens who have been granted registered provisional immigrant status… until … the Secretary has achieved and maintained operational control of the Southern border for the 12-month period immediately preceding such certification. …

"The term 'operational control' means that, within each and every sector of the Southern border, a condition exists in which there is an effectiveness rate, informed by situational awareness, of not lower than 90 percent. …

"The term 'effectiveness rate' means a metric, informed by situational awareness, that measures the percentage calculated by dividing—
(A) the number of illegal border crossers who are apprehended or turned back during a fiscal year … by
(B) the total number of illegal entries in the sector during such fiscal year.”

—From the text of Senate Amendment 1251 to S.744, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, proposed yesterday by Sen. John Cornyn (R-Texas) and 15 other Republican Party senators.

As it considers a sweeping immigration reform, the full U.S. Senate is expected to debate and vote on the Cornyn amendment today. Known as the “Requiring Enforcement, Security and safety while Upgrading Lawful Trade and travel Simultaneously (RESULTS)” provision, this amendment would tighten the so-called “trigger”: a border security threshold that must first be met in order for undocumented migrants to attain legal status.

In plain English: both the existing immigration reform bill and the Cornyn amendment are gauging border security using a measure that they call an “effectiveness rate.” To calculate it, they look at the number of border-crossers that U.S. authorities apprehend, the number who they “turn back” across the border, and the number whom they believe “got away.” Both the bill and the amendment call for a 90 percent effectiveness rate. To achieve this threshold, the number of “got aways” would have to be less than 10 percent of the total number of detected border-crossers.

If this 90 percent threshold is not met within five years, the current Senate bill would require a special Southern Border Security Commission to make recommendations for policy changes. An additional US$2 billion in border security funds (over an initial US$4.5 billion) would be available to implement the commission’s recommendations. If the 90 percent goal is not met, immigrants seeking to legalize their status would not be affected.

Under the Cornyn amendment, if the 90 percent threshold is not met, immigrants will not be allowed to exit their temporary “provisional immigrant” status and embark on the “path to citizenship.”

Some Democrats call this amendment a “poison pill" — a requirement that sets such a high border-security standard that it achieves what they believe to be the amendment’s authors’ real goal: blocking the "path to citizenship" for currently undocumented migrants.

The Facts:

The border security “trigger” argument hinges on whether the 90 percent “effectiveness rate” is a reasonable standard.

In 2011, statistics from a recent U.S. Government Accountability Office report reveal, the effectiveness rate was 84 percent. The illustration shows where the Border Patrol’s nine sectors stood that year (click to enlarge).

The Senate bill would increase spending on border security. Even more law enforcement presence along the border could increase apprehensions, which might appear to bring the 90 percent “effectiveness” goal within reach.

But the new security spending will also include investment in new technologies that, ironically, could make the 90 percent goal more elusive than ever.

A host of new sensors, cameras, drones, radars, and other imagery and detection equipment — some of it developed for Defense Department use in Iraq and Afghanistan — could find a great deal more border crossers who currently go undetected, especially in remote, rural areas. U.S. agencies’ new gadgets may tell them that the number of “got aways” is greater than they thought. That was the experience of an early 2013 test run of VADER, a Defense Department radar system, in Arizona. According to a report by the Center for Investigative Reporting, VADER revealed an “effectiveness rate” in Tucson many percentage points lower than the official number.

With technology revealing more “got-aways” than previously thought, the 90 percent threshold could be farther off, not closer. Meanwhile, heightened border security may drive border-crossers to even more remote areas, where actually being on the scene and apprehending people is hardest. Note the conditions right now in the massive Big Bend sector of west Texas, which registered a small number of migrants but the lowest “effectiveness rate” — 68 percent — of all sectors in 2011. Because Big Bend is far from any population centers, it may never become the number-one destination for migrants. But because it is so empty and difficult to patrol, there is still room for massive growth here, and in the neighboring Del Rio sector, if a crackdown succeeds elsewhere.

A look at the numbers, recent geographical migration trends, and the likely impact of better detection technologies leads us to conclude that the 90 percent threshold is unlikely to be met across the entire U.S.-Mexico border. As a result, the Cornyn amendment would probably put the “path to citizenship” out of reach.

— Adam Isacson

Filed under Border Security Migration immigration reform U.S. Congress

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Has “lacking border security” led to a halt in commerce or a spillover of violence at the border?


  “Less than 10 years ago, a trip from my home state across the border to Nuevo Laredo, one of several Mexican border cities, was routine. As a result, commerce and culture flowed across the border, benefiting both countries. Today, after years of lacking border security efforts, such travel is almost unthinkable. Sadly, the border has turned into a magnet for spillover violence from Central American drug cartels.”


— Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas), chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, in an April 23 op-ed published in Roll Call.

Rep. McCaul is correct that organized crime-related violence in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, has diminished travel to that city. Our own interviews with business, social and law enforcement leaders in Laredo, Texas found that it had been years since most had crossed the river into Nuevo Laredo.

But the Congressman, whose Austin-area district lies 250 miles from the border, leaves an incorrect impression that cross-border commerce has stopped, and that Nuevo Laredo’s violence is spilling over the border into the United States.

The Facts:

Cross-border commerce is busier than ever. According to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, in fiscal year 2011 U.S. goods and services trade with Mexico totaled $500 billion. U.S. exports across the border are up 77.6 percent since 2000, while imports are up 93.4 percent.

According to the Department of Justice, Laredo-Nuevo Laredo is the busiest inland port in the nation, “handling more freight than all the U.S. ports of entry to its west combined.” More than 700 of the Fortune 1,000 companies do international business via Laredo and “more than 9,000 trucks cross through town per day along with 1,800 loaded rail cars.”

The violence in Nuevo Laredo, meanwhile, is not spilling over, according to national crime statistics and local law enforcement.

According to police in Laredo, “violent crime is down and spillover from drug-war violence in Mexico is minimal.” Laredo (population 241,000) experienced 10 homicides in 2012.

Its violent crime rate in 2011, the last year for which full data were available (464.6 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants), while higher than the national average, is less than half that of Houston, and lower than San Antonio or Dallas. Laredo’s violent crime rate is only a shade higher than Austin (430.1 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants), the largest city within Rep. McCaul’s district. In fact, of the 32 Texas cities with 100,000-plus population in 2011, none of the four border cities was among the top 10 most violent (see graphic above).

Statistics show a similar lack of spillover along the border. Throughout the United States, the FBI Uniform Crime Report estimated a violent crime rate of 386.3 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2011. The same data available that year for counties touching the border showed an average of 268.3 violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. Border counties experienced 118 fewer violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants than the country as a whole.

— Adam Isacson (with research assistance from WOLA Intern Elizabeth Glusman)
 

Has “lacking border security” led to a halt in commerce or a spillover of violence at the border?

“Less than 10 years ago, a trip from my home state across the border to Nuevo Laredo, one of several Mexican border cities, was routine. As a result, commerce and culture flowed across the border, benefiting both countries. Today, after years of lacking border security efforts, such travel is almost unthinkable. Sadly, the border has turned into a magnet for spillover violence from Central American drug cartels.”

— Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas), chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, in an April 23 op-ed published in Roll Call.

Rep. McCaul is correct that organized crime-related violence in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, has diminished travel to that city. Our own interviews with business, social and law enforcement leaders in Laredo, Texas found that it had been years since most had crossed the river into Nuevo Laredo.

But the Congressman, whose Austin-area district lies 250 miles from the border, leaves an incorrect impression that cross-border commerce has stopped, and that Nuevo Laredo’s violence is spilling over the border into the United States.

The Facts:

Cross-border commerce is busier than ever. According to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, in fiscal year 2011 U.S. goods and services trade with Mexico totaled $500 billion. U.S. exports across the border are up 77.6 percent since 2000, while imports are up 93.4 percent.

According to the Department of Justice, Laredo-Nuevo Laredo is the busiest inland port in the nation, “handling more freight than all the U.S. ports of entry to its west combined.” More than 700 of the Fortune 1,000 companies do international business via Laredo and “more than 9,000 trucks cross through town per day along with 1,800 loaded rail cars.”

The violence in Nuevo Laredo, meanwhile, is not spilling over, according to national crime statistics and local law enforcement.

According to police in Laredo, “violent crime is down and spillover from drug-war violence in Mexico is minimal.” Laredo (population 241,000) experienced 10 homicides in 2012.

Its violent crime rate in 2011, the last year for which full data were available (464.6 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants), while higher than the national average, is less than half that of Houston, and lower than San Antonio or Dallas. Laredo’s violent crime rate is only a shade higher than Austin (430.1 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants), the largest city within Rep. McCaul’s district. In fact, of the 32 Texas cities with 100,000-plus population in 2011, none of the four border cities was among the top 10 most violent (see graphic above).

Statistics show a similar lack of spillover along the border. Throughout the United States, the FBI Uniform Crime Report estimated a violent crime rate of 386.3 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2011. The same data available that year for counties touching the border showed an average of 268.3 violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. Border counties experienced 118 fewer violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants than the country as a whole.

— Adam Isacson (with research assistance from WOLA Intern Elizabeth Glusman)  

Filed under Border Security Spillover U.S. Congress

0 notes

Is Yuma a standard for a secure border, or an outlier?


  “[W]e have to have control to the level we have on the Yuma sector today, and we can achieve it and it’s doable, so we’ll do it.”


— Sen. John McCain (R-Arizona), January 31, 2012

John McCain is one of eight senators, from both parties, who issued a proposal for immigration reform on Monday. The senators’ proposal establishes a “path to citizenship” for undocumented migrants. But as their plan foresees it, this reform wouldn’t begin until “enforcement measures have been completed” and a commission of state governors, attorneys-general, and community leaders certifies that the border is secure.

In other words, the senators’ plan requires that border security come first, before immigration reform. The White House’s plan, introduced Tuesday, does not include this condition. Whether the border must first be “secure” is emerging as a central point of disagreement.

The eight senators don’t seem to agree, though, what “secure” means. “If we made the path to citizenship contingent on a safe and secure border, and just used that phrase, then it’s in the eye of the beholder. It will always be subjective,” said Sen. Richard Durbin (D-Illinois). 

But Republicans McCain and Marco Rubio (R-Florida) define a secure border rather strictly. The Associated Press reports:

“Rubio has said that ‘operational security’ of the 2,000-mile border should be achieved before illegal immigrants can begin to achieve citizenship. He’s defined that as law enforcement having a very high probability of being able to prevent somebody from illegally crossing the border or apprehending them if they do. A Government Accountability Office report in 2011 said that of the nine southwestern border sectors, only the Yuma, Ariz., sector had reported full operational security. [Also called ‘operational control.’]”

The Facts:

The Yuma sector, encompassing the border in far eastern California and far western Arizona, is one of nine sectors into which Border Patrol divides the U.S.-Mexico border. Of all nine, it is the sector that has seen the steepest drop in apprehensions of migrants (and thus, presumably, the steepest drop in migrant crossings) since 2005: from 138,000 apprehensions that year to 6,000 in 2011.

Holding all nine border sectors to the Yuma standard of “operational security,” though, may be too high a standard. The Yuma sector is something of an outlier.

It has no major destination cities to attract migrants; the sector’s only significant population centers within 200 miles of the border are Yuma (population 95,000), Blythe (21,000) and Wellton (3,000), Arizona. Only two north-south roads, neither an interstate highway, parallel the Colorado river. The terrain is empty desert.

Google Maps satellite view of the Yuma sector.The Yuma sector has only three Border Patrol stations. This is the least of all nine sectors, some of which have 12. It ranks seventh among the nine sectors in the number of miles of border that must be guarded (126), so it is not unusual that it should be eighth in migrant apprehensions.



Yet despite these advantages, the Yuma sector shows how difficult “operational security” is to maintain, much less to define. In 2012, Yuma was one of four sectors to register an increase in migrant apprehensions — a 14 percent rise, with 40 percent of those caught coming from countries other than Mexico (principally Central America).

If immigration reform must wait until all nine border sectors have reached the standard of Yuma today, as Senators McCain and Rubio indicate, then immigration reform may have to wait a long time.

— Adam Isacson

Is Yuma a standard for a secure border, or an outlier?

“[W]e have to have control to the level we have on the Yuma sector today, and we can achieve it and it’s doable, so we’ll do it.”

Sen. John McCain (R-Arizona), January 31, 2012

John McCain is one of eight senators, from both parties, who issued a proposal for immigration reform on Monday. The senators’ proposal establishes a “path to citizenship” for undocumented migrants. But as their plan foresees it, this reform wouldn’t begin until “enforcement measures have been completed” and a commission of state governors, attorneys-general, and community leaders certifies that the border is secure.

In other words, the senators’ plan requires that border security come first, before immigration reform. The White House’s plan, introduced Tuesday, does not include this condition. Whether the border must first be “secure” is emerging as a central point of disagreement.

The eight senators don’t seem to agree, though, what “secure” means. “If we made the path to citizenship contingent on a safe and secure border, and just used that phrase, then it’s in the eye of the beholder. It will always be subjective,” said Sen. Richard Durbin (D-Illinois).

But Republicans McCain and Marco Rubio (R-Florida) define a secure border rather strictly. The Associated Press reports:

“Rubio has said that ‘operational security’ of the 2,000-mile border should be achieved before illegal immigrants can begin to achieve citizenship. He’s defined that as law enforcement having a very high probability of being able to prevent somebody from illegally crossing the border or apprehending them if they do. A Government Accountability Office report in 2011 said that of the nine southwestern border sectors, only the Yuma, Ariz., sector had reported full operational security. [Also called ‘operational control.’]”

The Facts:

The Yuma sector, encompassing the border in far eastern California and far western Arizona, is one of nine sectors into which Border Patrol divides the U.S.-Mexico border. Of all nine, it is the sector that has seen the steepest drop in apprehensions of migrants (and thus, presumably, the steepest drop in migrant crossings) since 2005: from 138,000 apprehensions that year to 6,000 in 2011.

Holding all nine border sectors to the Yuma standard of “operational security,” though, may be too high a standard. The Yuma sector is something of an outlier.

It has no major destination cities to attract migrants; the sector’s only significant population centers within 200 miles of the border are Yuma (population 95,000), Blythe (21,000) and Wellton (3,000), Arizona. Only two north-south roads, neither an interstate highway, parallel the Colorado river. The terrain is empty desert.

image
Google Maps satellite view of the Yuma sector.

The Yuma sector has only three Border Patrol stations. This is the least of all nine sectors, some of which have 12. It ranks seventh among the nine sectors in the number of miles of border that must be guarded (126), so it is not unusual that it should be eighth in migrant apprehensions.

image

Yet despite these advantages, the Yuma sector shows how difficult “operational security” is to maintain, much less to define. In 2012, Yuma was one of four sectors to register an increase in migrant apprehensions — a 14 percent rise, with 40 percent of those caught coming from countries other than Mexico (principally Central America).

If immigration reform must wait until all nine border sectors have reached the standard of Yuma today, as Senators McCain and Rubio indicate, then immigration reform may have to wait a long time.

— Adam Isacson

Filed under Border Security Immigration Reform U.S. Congress Migration

0 notes

Is only 44 percent of the border “secure?”

In late 2010, DHS reported that it could respond to illegal activity along only 44 percent of the Southwest border, leaving 7,500 border miles inadequately protected.

Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas), chairman of the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management, November 15, 2012.

The Facts:

The 44 percent statistic comes from a February 2011 report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), based on interviews with Border Patrol. In the report, GAO found that Border Patrol had “operational control” of 873 miles of the 1,969-mile U.S.-Mexico border, or 44 percent. (The report did not investigate conditions at the United States’ 5,525-mile border with Canada, the remainder of Rep. McCaul’s 7,500-mile figure.)

Rep. McCaul’s statement implies that the term “operational control” means U.S. authorities “could respond to illegal activity.” In fact, the standard is significantly higher.

GAO defines operational control as “Border Patrol was able to detect, respond, and interdict cross-border illegal activity.” The 2006 Secure Fence Act has an even more stringent definition: “the prevention of all unlawful entries into the United States, including entries by terrorists, other unlawful aliens, instruments of terrorism, narcotics, and other contraband.”

By that standard, it is remarkable that U.S. authorities believed that they had so much control of 873 miles of terrain that nothing at all could cross the line. And the same GAO report found that, between 2005 and 2010, Border Patrol had added an average of 126 miles per year of border under operational control. If that rate continued in 2011 and 2012, then 1,125 miles of border — 57 percent — might be under operational control today.


(Chart from Februrary 2011 GAO report.)

We don’t know how much of the border is under operational control today, however. The Department of Homeland Security abandoned “operational control” as a measure of performance in 2011, opting instead for more of a “spectrum” or “continuum” approach than an “on or off” standard.

— Adam Isacson

Filed under Border Security U.S. Congress

1 note

Cross-border terrorism: does “evidence to compel” further action exist?

Last November, the Republican Party majority of the U.S. House of Representatives’ Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management issued a report on border and hemispheric security. A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the Southwest Border alleges, among several other claims, that the U.S.-Mexico border is vulnerable to infiltration by Islamic terrorists seeking to do harm on U.S. soil.

“Of growing concern and potentially a more violent threat to American citizens is the enhanced ability of Middle East terrorist organizations, aided by their relationships and growing presence in the Western Hemisphere, to exploit the Southwest border to enter the United States undetected.”

The report calls on the U.S. government to mobilize against this vulnerability — which it compares to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis — before an attack materializes.

“Recognizing and proactively confronting threats has presented a perennial challenge to our country. In the case of the Cuban missile crisis, we failed to deal with the Soviet threat before it resulted in a full-blown crisis that threatened nuclear war. Now we are faced with a new threat in Latin America that comes from the growing collaborations between Iran, Venezuela, Hezbollah and transnational criminal organizations. Similar to the Cuban missile crisis, the evidence to compel action exists; the only question is whether we possess the imagination to connect the dots before another disaster strikes.”

The Facts:

To back up its argument that the U.S. government must make an even higher priority of the cross-border terrorism scenario, the Subcommittee cites the following pieces of “evidence to compel action.”

  1. A May 2012 Los Angeles Times blog post, citing an unnamed former U.S. official, reported that Osama bin Laden supported the idea of terrorists with Mexican passports carrying out attacks inside the United States. U.S. intelligence analysts gleaned this from letters and notes seized from the Pakistan site where U.S. Special Forces killed bin Laden in 2011. The official gave no indication of an actual plot in the works; the context was apparently bin Laden’s personal preference that terrorist attackers not be people who had sworn a U.S. citizenship oath.
  • Indication that individuals with terrorist links crossed border: No
  • Claim of specific terrorist conspiracy: No
  1. A statement from a former U.S. official:

“In August 2007 former Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell stated that not only have terrorists used the Southwest border to enter the United States but that they will inevitably continue to do so as long as it is an available possibility.”

This claim comes from an El Paso Times interview with former DNI McConnell. He does claim that “there are some” cases of terrorists coming across the Southwest border, but “not in great numbers.” When the interviewer tries repeatedly to get McConnell to be more specific, he replies:

  • “The vast majority you don’t hear about.”
  • “There are some. And would they use it as a path, given it was available to them? In time they will.”
  • “There were a significant number of Iraqis who came across last year. Smuggled across illegally.”
  • “Q: Can you give me any more detail [about the Iraqis]? A: I probably could if I had my notebook. It’s significant numbers. I’ll have somebody get it for you. I don’t remember what it is. The point is it went from a number to (triple) in a single year, because they figured it out. Now some we caught, some we didn’t. The ones that get in, what are they going to do? They’re going to write home.”

It is unclear whether the “Iraqis” McConnell refers to where proven terrorists, or simply migrants.

  • Indication that individuals with terrorist links crossed border: Yes
  • Examples given: None
  • Evidence of specific terrorist conspiracy: No
  1. A statement from a current U.S. official:

“In a July 2012 hearing before the full U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano confirmed that terrorists have crossed the Southwest border with the intent to harm the American people.”

When pressed for more detail, Napolitano told Rep. Ron Barber (D-Arizona),

“With respect, there have been—and the Ababziar matter would be one I would refer to that’s currently being adjudicated in the criminal courts—from time to time, and we are constantly working against different and evolving threats involving various terrorist groups and various ways they may seek to enter the country.”

Napolitano provided no further information. As WOLA has noted before, the “Ababziar matter” involved Iranian operatives allegedly seeking help from Mexico’s Zetas criminal organization for a plot to kill Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States. But the Iranians, in fact, never ended up making contact with the Zetas.

  • Indication that individuals with terrorist links crossed border: Yes
  • Examples given: None
  • Evidence of specific terrorist conspiracy: No
  1. Apprehensions of migrants from 35 countries that the U.S. intelligence community considers to be of “special interest” because they “could export individuals that could bring harm to our country in the way of terrorism.” According to the Subcommittee, U.S. authorities apprehended 1,918 citizens of these 35 countries in the U.S.-Mexico border zone between 2006 and 2011. There is no indication whether any of these individuals in fact posed a terrorist threat, or whether they were merely would-be migrants.
  • Indication that individuals with terrorist links crossed border: No
  • Evidence of specific terrorist conspiracy: No
  1. The case of Said Jaziri, a Tunisian cleric captured in the trunk of a vehicle in San Diego, California in January 2011. Jaziri was not accused of plotting any terrorist activity. He had been convicted in France “for assaulting an individual whom he believed to be a less-devout Muslim,” and while in Canada had “called for the death” — as the London Daily Mail put it — of the Danish cartoonist whose images of the Prophet Mohammed sparked outrage in the Muslim world in 2006.
  • Indication that individuals with terrorist links crossed border: No
  • Evidence of specific terrorist conspiracy: No
  1. The case of Ahmed Dhakane, a Somali convicted of running “a large-scale smuggling operation out of Brazil that specialized in smuggling East Africans into the United States.” Prosecutors claim that among the migrants whom Dhakane smuggled were three Somalis “whom Dhakane knew to be supporters or operatives of AIAI [Al-Ittihad Al-Islami, a group on the U.S. terrorist list] and of the Somali terrorist organization Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin (al-Shabaab).” The Subcommittee report mentions no intention or plan to carry out terrorist activities in the United States.
  • Indication that individuals with terrorist links crossed border: Yes
  • Examples given: One, three individuals
  • Evidence of specific terrorist conspiracy: No
  1. The case of Anthony Joseph Tracy, convicted in 2010 for helping “approximately 272 Somalis [to] enter the United States illegally.” Tracy said that members of al-Shabaab had asked for his help getting to the United States, “but that he declined to help them. In spite of this denial, investigators discovered an ominous email message from Tracy where he wrote: ‘i helped a lot of Somalis and most are good but there are some who are bad and i leave them to ALLAH…’”
  • Indication that individuals with terrorist links crossed border: Unclear
  • Examples given: None
  • Evidence of specific terrorist conspiracy: No

The authors of the Subcommittee report are right that the hypothetical scenario of terrorists crossing the border from Mexico demands constant vigilance. It would be irresponsible to dismiss it.

But with the evidence they present — vague official statements, three cases with no mention of any intent to engage in terrorist activity — the authors of the report do not make the case that U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies need to be more vigilant than they already are.

The amount of intelligence, military and law enforcement resources available to monitor potential threats is finite. With more immediate concerns in North Africa, Syria, Afghanistan-Pakistan and elsewhere, the resources available to monitor Latin America and the Caribbean are even more limited.

U.S. authorities must choose wisely how these resources get used. Organized crime, money laundering, arms, drug and human trafficking, corruption, and migrant deaths already pose daily challenges in the U.S.-Mexico border area.

Preparing for possible cross-border Islamic terrorism is a significant additional challenge, but the Subcommittee report acknowledges that it requires “imagination” at this point. The State Department, meanwhile, reported last July that “no known international terrorist organization had an operational presence in Mexico and no terrorist group targeted U.S. citizens in or from Mexican territory.”

In our view, the evidence presented in the Line in the Sand report is not compelling enough to justify diverting resources — whether existing or additional — away from challenges that U.S. personnel already face every day in the U.S.-Mexico border zone.

— Adam Isacson

Filed under Border Security Terrorism U.S. Congress

3 notes

Is Arizona suffering “increased crime and drugs” because of the border?

“Washington has failed miserably when it comes to securing our borders. While the federal government refuses to protect our borders, Arizona taxpayers continue to pay the price in the form of increased crime and drugs in our communities.”

Campaign website of Wil Cardon, one of two main Republican candidates competing in Arizona’s August 28 Senate primary election.

“[T]he situation along the border has changed significantly. In years past, groups of illegal aliens crossing the southern border tied to drug or smuggling cartels were the exception to the rule. Today, such ties are the rule. The lawless situation in northern Mexico largely driven by drug cartels is fueling lawlessness north of the border.”

Campaign website of Rep. Jeff Flake, one of two main Republican candidates competing in Arizona’s August 28 Senate primary election.

Both of the principal contenders in Arizona’s hotly contested primary campaign to choose a Republican Senate candidate believe that an insecure border is contributing to “increased crime and drugs” and “lawlessness” in their state.

The Facts:

The Arizona state government’s Department of Public Safety publishes ten years’ worth of Crime in Arizona Reports detailing criminal activity in each of Arizona’s fifteen counties. We looked at the ten counties that make up the southernmost half of the state, and would thus be most susceptible to any cross-border activity. (These ten counties also comprise 89 percent of Arizona’s population, according to U.S. Census data, so the statewide trend is not much different than what we observe here.)

We found that despite the candidates’ views of the border, measures of violent crime are substantially lower now than they were a decade ago in Arizona’s counties closest to the border.

Homicides in these counties are down 17.9 percent from 2002 to 2011, from 363 to 298.


(Click to enlarge)

Robberies in these counties are down 11.6 percent from 2002 to 2011, from 7,744 to 6,842.


(Click to enlarge)

Cases of aggravated assault in these counties are down 24.5 percent from 2002 to 2011, from 17,837 to 13,471.


(Click to enlarge)

Rep. Flake says that the rising crime reflects an “increasingly dangerous” situation that is so bad that “border security must be addressed before other [immigration] reforms are tackled.” We would ask him, and his opponent, where they are seeing violent crime worsening in Arizona as a result of an insecure border. Their own state government’s data tell a very different story.

Here are the tables of data, drawn from the Crime in Arizona Reports, used to make the above charts.

By Adam Isacson

Filed under Border Security Spillover Arizona U.S. Congress Elections

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Should we be “highly concerned” about closing 7 Border Patrol stations?

“We are highly concerned that these closures will undercut proven methods to intercept drug smugglers, human traffickers and illegal immigrants in corridors that they use extensively north of the U.S.-Mexico border. We urge you in the strongest terms to rescind the decision.”

— 12 Republican Representatives’ response to a June 22 announcement that the U.S. Border Patrol would be closing seven out of the 73 stations it maintains near the U.S.-Mexico border. It came in a July 20 letter [PDF] to the chief of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).

CBP explained that closing the stations — all of them more than 100 miles from the U.S.-Mexico border — plus two in Idaho and Montana, would allow it to move 41 agents closer to the northern and southern borders. US$1.3 million would be saved by closing small stations in Abilene, Amarillo, Dallas, Lubbock, San Angelo and San Antonio, Texas; Riverside, California; and (near Canada) Billings, Montana and Twin Falls, Idaho.

A report on the Fox News website contends that the closure will “undercut efforts to intercept drug and human traffickers in well-traveled corridors north of the U.S.-Mexico border.” It adds, “one soon-to-be-shuttered station in Amarillo, Texas, is right in the middle of the I-40 corridor.” Reading the same story further, however, reveals that the Amarillo station presently hosts only two Border Patrol agents to cover this entire “corridor.”

The CBP explanation didn’t satisfy the twelve legislators, either, whose letter to Chief David Aguilar makes a bizarre, unsourced charge using the passive voice.

“Fears have also been expressed that your plan is part of a systematic attempt to dismantle interior enforcement of our immigration laws and give illegal immigrants a ‘free pass’ should they successfully cross the border.”

The Facts:

Here is a map of all 73 of the Border Patrol’s U.S.-Mexico border-sector stations, indicating the seven to be closed with red markers. The map makes clear that CBP is closing some of the stations most distant from the border. The station in Amarillo, in the Texas panhandle, is 418 miles by road from the nearest border port of entry.

(View Border Patrol Sectors and Stations in a larger map)

Here is a chart of the U.S. Border Patrol’s nine sectors along the U.S.-Mexico land border. They are organized according to the number of undocumented migrants apprehended in each during 2011. (Click to enlarge it.)

Apprehensions data from U.S. Border Patrol.

As we hope this chart makes evident, in sectors that are seeing very little migration, CBP is closing a small fraction of stations most distant from the border. U.S. taxpayers will no longer have to pay the cost of maintaining these seven stations.

By Adam Isacson

Filed under Border Security Border Patrol U.S. Congress

2 notes

Are terrorists crossing the border “from time to time?”

“[T]here have been [terrorists crossing our southern border with the intent to do harm to the American people] from time to time.”

Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano

This “time to time” quote was Secretary Napolitano’s response to a question from Rep. Ron Barber (D-Arizona) at a July 25 hearing of the House Homeland Security Committee. The full exchange was as follows:

Rep. Barber: “As you know, Madam Secretary, there have been anecdotal reports about material evidence of the presence of terrorists along our southern border. My question is, is there any credible evidence that these reports are accurate and that terrorists are, in fact, crossing our southern border with the intent to do harm to the American people?”

Secretary Napolitano: “With respect, there have been—and the Ababziar matter would be one I would refer to that’s currently being adjudicated in the criminal courts—from time to time, and we are constantly working against different and evolving threats involving various terrorist groups and various ways they may seek to enter the country.”

The Facts:

Six days after this exchange, the Department of State released its annual Country Reports on Terrorism report. Within the opening paragraph of its Mexico chapter is the following:

“No known international terrorist organization had an operational presence in Mexico and no terrorist group targeted U.S. citizens in or from Mexican territory.”

It would seem that the State and Homeland Security Departments need to get their story straight on this very important national security issue.

By Adam Isacson

Filed under Terrorism Border Security U.S. Congress DHS

0 notes

Does the new anti-tunnel law matter?

"For too long, criminal cartels have been able to construct and use illegal cross-border tunnels to smuggle weapons, drugs and people across our border, without facing adequately harsh consequences. This bill is an important step in our efforts to secure our Southern border."

— Rep. Ben Quayle (R-Arizona), in a statement upon the passage of the Border Tunnel Prevention Act (H.R. 4119), which he co-sponsored with Rep. Silvestre Reyes (D-Texas).

The facts:

This new law’s impact is likely to be less important than Rep. Quayle contends. The Border Tunnel Prevention Act, which President Obama signed on June 5, tightens penalties for people caught building tunnels under the U.S.-Mexico border for smuggling purposes.

However, an analysis from the U.S. Congressional Budget Office noted that the Act would cost the U.S. government very little to enforce because it “would apply to a relatively small number of additional offenders.”

Critics of the bill, like Rep. Bobby Scott (D-Virginia), argue that the Border Tunnel Prevention Act offers the illusion of action while giving law enforcement little in the way of new tools to improve border security.

"We should not be decorating the criminal code with more and more pages. We ought to be simplifying the code. While I do think border tunnels are a serious problem, I believe we already have adequate laws with very harsh penalties to deal with the problem."

By Adam Isacson

Filed under Border Security Tunnels U.S. Congress